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ANTHONY
v. STA'l'E BOARD
OF EDUCATION et al., Appellants.
[1] Licenses- Revocation- Iicaring.·-Unless a statute expressly
provides to the contrary, a license cannot be revoked without
where the statute
a quasi judicial
determination by Hn administrative agency that there be cause
for the revocation.

a

[2]

Code, § 12756,
declaring that whenever the holder of any credential issue;d by
the State Board of Education has been convicted of any sex

[1] See Cal.Jur.,
[2] See Cal.Jur.,
McK. Dig. Refere.nccs: [11 61 7J .ul~>c.u:;c:;,
§ 102; (5] Liceuses1 §54.

C.2d

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

forthwith"
hecon1es
that the credential should be revoked without the
would be incident to
fact that related
revocation of
eresex offens2s make express
&S
to revocation
intent
is to be
§ 12756, which provides for revocation
credelltials on conviction of sex offenses.
Id.-Teachers-Dismissal-Hearing.-In the revocation of a
liccmse for the conviction of a
crime under statutes
like Ed. Code, § 12756, relating to revocation of tearhing
credentinls on cmlViction of sex oiienses, there is no real
necessity for the board to examine the
resolve any conflicts in the
and exercise its judgment in respect
thereto, since there can be little dispute as to the conviction,
which is a matter of public record, and the question of identity
is not likely to arise.
Licen&es-Revocation.-Whether a conviction is of a crime
of the character specified in statutes providing for the revocation of a lic0nse is a
of law.
Id.-Revocation-Hearing.-.l:tevocations of licenses pursuant
to statute on grounds of convictions of speeifled crimes constitute ministerial action by the hoar<i rather than quasi
judicial action.
Id.-Revocation-Hearing.-Where the mandatory duty is imposed on a board to revoke a license on the licensee's conviction of a specified crime, no hearing by the hoard is required
or contemplated, and the licensee's constitutional rights are
not violated.
revocation of
!lredcntials hy the State Bmu·d of
Ed. Code, § 12756, for com iction of s2x
a dismissal
the loeui sehool board follo1Ys as a matter of eourt~e because
a goyeening board of a sc:.hool district shall ernploy in positions
cr~d~ntL·:ds
snf•h persons as have cred~~ntials ~ no
would appear to be required in such a case.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City anc1 County of San li'ranc.isco. H. A. van cler Zee, Judge.
Reversed.

Proceeding in mnnC!mnns to compel reinstatement of a
teacher. J udgmellt grautiug writ, reversed.

H. Duane for
this mandamus prothe reinstatement of his state credentials
He named as defendants the
and commission on
the board of education of the
and others.

tracher with permanent tenure employed
by the San Francisco board; that no
have been
him of immoral or unprofessional
filed against him
conduct or any other
; that on September 28, 1953,
the San Francisco board dismissed
as a teacher without a hearing, without ''
against him,
and without notice; that defendants acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in revoking his credentials.
The superior court issued an alternative writ of mandate
and in their return thereto anrl answer to the petition, defendants admit plaintiil'
the credentials issued by the
state board and that he wafl a permanent tenure teacher in
the San Francisco schools. They alleged that the state board
did revoke plaintiff's credentials under the laws of California,
particularly section ] 2011.7 1 of the Education Code, and
pursuant to section 12756 of that code ;2 that by reason of
"''Sex offense' as used in Sections 12107, 12756, 12785, 13001.3, and
14002.3 of this code means any offen~e defined in Sections 266, 267, 285,
286, 288, 2S8a,
subdivision 3 or 4 of Section 261, subdivision 5 of
Section 647, or
1 or :>. of Section 311 of the Penal Code; or any
offense involving lewd and lasc·ivious conduct under Section 702 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code; or any
to commit any of the
above-mentioned offenses; or
offense
or attempted in any
other state which, if
or attempted in this State, would have
been punishable as one or more of the above-mentioned offenses.'' (Ed.
Code, § 12011.7.)
""Whenever the holder of
issued by the State Board of
has been convicted of any sex
offense as defined in Section 2011.7 the State Board of Education shall
forthwith suspend the crcclcntiaL
, or do,'umcnt. If the conviction is reversed and the holder is ac4,uitted W: the offense ill a DeW

C.2d

Exhibits were attached.
copy of the minutes of the state board
that certain named perhave their credentials revoked because of conviction of sex offenses. A resolution was duly
the credentials of all of these persons because
of their conviction of sex offenses as defined in section 12011.7
of the Education Code; the resolution was passed pursuant
to section 12756 of that code. The other exhibits are certified
of the proceedings in the municipal court in Los
Angeles. One of these showed plaintiff had pleaded guilty
to a violation of section 41.10 of ordinance 77000 of the city
of Los Angeles. 3 and that he was sentenced to 90 days in
jail but that execution was suspended and plaintiff was
placed on probation for two years, 20 days of which must be
spent in jail. The other transcript showed that he had pleaded
guilty to ''vagrancy lewd" for which he was fined $50.
The order to show cause issued with the alternative writ
came on for hearing, at which time defendants served and
filed their return and answer. Plaintiff's counsel said he
would put on his evidence and that the only question involved
was that the revocation of plaintiff's credentials by the state
board and his dismissal by the San Francisco board were had
without charges, notice or hearing. He put plaintiff on the
stand but nothing was developed that had not been admitted
other than letters between the state board and plaintiff. It
was stipulated that the credentials were revoked on October
29, 1953. Defendants introduced into evidence a certified copy
of the portion of the Los Angeles ordinance containing section
41.10 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, S1lpra. Plaintiff
filed no replication or answer to defendants' return and
answer. The matter was submitted; judgment was for plaintiff. 'l'he judgment recited that the state board had revoked
plaintiff's credentials; that the San Francisco board had distrlal or the charges against him are dismissed, the board shall forthwith
tenninnte the suspension of the credential, life diploma, or document.
\Vhen the conviction becomes final or when imposition of sentence is
suspended the board shall forthwith revoke the credential, life diploma, or
document." (Ed. Code, ~ 12756.)
3
' ' No person shnll rent, let or assign any room or apartment with the
understanding or belief that such room or apartment is to be used by
the person or persons to whom it is sold, let, rented or assigned for the
purpose of J,aving sexual intercourse with a person to whom he or she is
not manicd, or for the purpose of performing or participating in any
lewd act with any such pen;on.'' (Los Angeles Munici,pal Code, ~ 41.10.)
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[45 C.2d 255; 288 P.2d 8621

missed petitioner in excess of its
and in abuse
of its discretion; and ordered the reinstatement of tl<e credentials and plaintiff to his position as teacher.
Defendants assert that no notice or
for a revocation of
credentials
should not be construed as ..Dr,ni»inn a
Bewe are compelled
of a combination of several
agree with defendants' assertion.
Plaintiff relies on the rule of statutory construction that
statutes should be construed so as to require a hearing.
The most recent expression by this court on that quesis in Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260, 271
[24(:i P.2d 656], where we said: " . . . it has been held that
unless the statute expressly provides to the contrary a license
cannot be revoked without a hearing where the statute contemplates a quasi judicial determination by the administrative
agency that there be cause for the revocation; that because
of reasons of justice and policy the statute will be interpreted
to require a hearing. (Ratliff v. Lampton, 32 Ca1.2d 226
[195 P.2d 792, 10 A.L.R.2d 826}: Carroll v. California Horse
Racing Board, supra, 16 Cal.2d 164 [105 P.2d 110] ; LaPrade
v. Department of Water & Power, supra, 27 Cal.2d 47 [162
P.2d 13] ; Covert v. State Board of Equal1:zation, 29 Cal.2d
125 [173 P.2d 545); Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs.,
26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816] ; Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal.
197 [116 P. 732] ; Welch v. W acre, 161 Cal. 641 [119 P. 1080] ;
Knights of Ku If.lux Klan, Inc. v. Fmncis, 79 Cal.App. 383
[249 P. 539].)"
[2] Here the statute ( § 12756, supra) provides that when
a person has been convicted of any one of certain specified
offenses the state board "shall" (ordinarily a mandatory
word [Ed. Code, § 19] ) "forthwith" revoke the credential
when the conviction becomes final. This implies that the
credential should be revoked without the delay which would
be incident to a hearing, probably for the reason that teachers
convicted of sex offenses should be promptly removed from
the classroom and contact with students.
[3] Other related statutory provisions dealing with revocation of credentials on grounds other than conviction of
sex offenses make express provision for notice and hearing.
Section 12752.1 of the Education Code requires notice and
hearing for revocation under sections 12751 and 12752 which
deal generally with revocation for cause, but makes no refer-

ence

w

suspensions and revocations under section 127 56,
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statutes

(See Escobeclo
[4] In the revocation of a
a specified crime
statutes
section 12756 there is no
real necessity for the board to "examine the facts, resolve
any conflicts in the
and exercise its judgment in
respect thereto" (Covert
Stale
Equalization, 29
Cal.2d 125, 131 [ 173 P .2d
) . There can be little dispute
as to the conviction as it
a matter of public record and
the question of
is not likdy to arise.
Whether
the conviction is of a crime of the character specified is a
question of law.
Revocations on such
constitute
ministerial action
the board rather than
judicial
action. For illustration. in
with the disbarment of
an attorney for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude it was said in In re
188 Cal. 701, 706 [206 P.
990, 32 A.L.R.
It will thus appear that the supreme
court of the United States has in these cases definitely held
that the legislature has power to
that the conviction
of a person of a crime, who had
thereto been given the
right or privilege of
in the practice of either of
said learned professions, should,
facto, work a revocation
of his right or privilege to lawfully continue so to do. If the
legislature thus possesses this
of power in respect
to those members of such
who have been convicted
of crimes involving moral turpitude it may not be contended
that the legislature has not also the power to provide that
the record of such conviction shall constitute conclusive evidence of the fact of such conviction for the purpose of having
stricken from the rolls of such
the name of the
person who has been thus convicted of snch a crime ..•• In
this view of the matter the essential fact working a deprivation of the petitioner's
and
of continuing in
thr practiee of his
was not his conviction of a crime,
nor was it the order of this court made automatically upon
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but it was his

made.
simL::r view
of In re Riccm·(· :. 182 CaL 675
wherein the court says:
" 'It has
been understu)d that conviction of an
attorney of a felony or misdemeaiL :· involving moral turpimade disbarment
w iLhont any discretion in
this court to
other
And this, we think, must
be so, in view of section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which prescribes
to be
in such a
case, viz., ''that the name of the
shall be stricken from
the roll of attorneys and counselors of the court, and that
he be precluded from
as snch attorney or counselor
in all the courts of this
'' while in other cases the judgment ''may be according to the
of the offense charged;
deprivation of the
to practice . . .
or for
limited period." 'vVe do not see how the legislature could
have more clearly expressed its detrrmination that the only
penalty in such a case is permanent disbarment. And certainly it would not be a wise rule that would invest the court
with discretionary power in a matter where the sole evidence
upon which it acts is a certified copy of a record of conviction.'
"In the case of In re Shepard, 35 CaLApp. 492 [170 P.
, the
involved in this proceeding arose
and in passing upon the same the district court of appeal said:
" 'It is insisted that this court had no jurisdiction to remove
Shepard's name from the roll of attorneys without notice.
Under these sections
for removal or susare divided into two classes. 'rhc first of these inalone,
based upon convictions of felonies
or misdemeanors, involving moral turpitude. The second
class includes two sub-classes,
those proceedings to be
taken for matters within the knowledge of the court, and,
second, those which may be taken npon the information of
anothcr. Certainly it appears to us1 whether notice is required

[45 C.2d
u:r•oce:edin~rs

under both sub-classes of the second class or
it
not, it is clear that no notice is required in
proceedings of the first class.'
u ••• The same point arose in the case of In re Bloor, 21
Mont. 49 [52 P. 779], under a statute taken bodily from our
own code
and in which the court said:
" 'We believe no complaint or accusation in writing is
necessary where an attorney or counselor has been convicted
of a felony, or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and
where the record of conviction has been duly certified to this
court. We also think that it is not necessary to issue or serve
any citation upon an attorney or counselor, of proceedings
to disbar him, where he has been convicted of a felony, or a
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and where the record
of his conviction has been duly certified to this court, before
this court acts, where such record is the basis of the disbarment proceedings. It is the bounden duty of such attorney
so convicted, to know that the legal consequences of his conviction is his disbarment. There is no discretion in the
supreme court, for it must proceed under section 418, Code
Civ. Proc., on receipt of a certified copy of the record of
conviction ; and by section 402, I d., the record of conviction
is conclusive evidence.' " (See In 1·e Hallina;n, 43 Cal.2d
243 [272 P.2d 768].) [7] It is clear therefore that plaintiff's
constitutional rights were not violated and that where the
mandatory duty is imposed on a board to revoke a license
(credentials here) upon the conviction of the licensee of a
specified crime no hearing by the board is required or contemplated. A different problem is presented with respect
to a hearing where the revocation is based on the conviction
of a specified crime as was indicated in Ratliff v. Lampton,
32 Cal.2d 226, 227 [195 P.2d 792, 10 A.L.R.2d 826]: "We are
not concerned with those provisions which make it mandatory
upon the department to revoke or suspend the privilege of
any person to operate a motor vehicle upon the highway upon
receipt of a record showing that he has been convicted of
certain specified offenses. {Veh. Code, §§ 304, 305, 307,
315(a) (3).) In such cases the facts have already been
determined in the criminal proceeding. A different situation
is present, however, where, as here, the department must
make an independent determination of facts as a basis for
its action, and this was recognized by the Legislature in the
detailed, albeit somewhat confusing, provisions o:f the 1945
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and

revie\v~''

The dismissal of plaintiff by the San Francisco board
followed as a matter of course the revocation of hi,., credentials
because a governing board of a school district shall employ
credentials only such
who have
(Ed. Code,
12001, 13001.)
or
vmuld appear to be required in such a case.
The
must be reversed but on retrial
may show that the boards exceeded their
m that
the convictions were not those
section 12756
or that he was not the person convicted and thus obtain
relief. Plaintiff argues those questions here but
in the trial court he relied solely on the lack of notice and
which was the basis of that court's decision.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-Upon the record in this case, I find no
issue of fact to be determined upon a retrial. It is said in
the majority opinion that ''on retrial plaintiff may show
that the boards exceeded their authority in that the convictions were not those contemplated by section 12756 or that
he was not the person convicted and thus obtain appropriate
relief. Plaintiff argues those questions here but in the trial
court he relied solely on the lack of notice and hearing which
was the basis of that court's decision."
The first point, as conceded by the majority, presents "a
question of law." All of the documents necessary to a determination of the nature of the crime of which DiGenova
assertedly was convicted were received in evidence. \Vhether
the convictions shown by those documents were ''sex offenses''
within the meaning of section 12756 of the Education Code
involves no issue of fact, and the question may, and should
be, decided upon this appeal. Insofar as lack of proof of
identity is concerned, the petitioner has studiously avoided
in petition, brief and arg'ument, making any claim that he
•The local board may suspend a teacher on conviction of certain
crimes but the teacher may have a he:uing if he demands it within 30
days after notice of his sne]'GnG:nn: if he docs not dem~nd it he is
dismissed. It is not clear here whether proper notice was given or a
hearing demanded,

C.2d
is not the person who
offenses shown in
for hearing in this
to evidence in
the record sufficient to establish such a conviction. DiGenova
in his answer to the
tention that the
was whether or
revocation of his
cence with reference
lants, was not an issue in
Trial Court.''
The burden of
to show that the
or unauthorized. (Sterling
207 Cal. 370, 373 [278 P. 859] ;
Corp. v.
Cook v. Reid, 39 Cal.App.
458 [183 P. 820]; Fraser v.
Cummings, 48 Cal.App.
507
P. 100) ; "MacLeod v.
Long, 110 Cal.App.
; Sevina v. Hickok,
113 Cal.App. 301, 305
Nowhere in this proceeding has DiGenova asserted that he is not the person
convicted or that the crimes involved are not sex offenses
within the meaning of section 12756 of the Education Code.
On the contrary, in response to
from the bench at
the hearing of this appeal as to whether DiGenova cleims
that he is not the person who was convicted as charged, his
counsel refused a direct answer. His reply was that the
action of the board of education is challenged solely upon
the ground that his client was denied notice and hearing as
ailsertedly required
The effect of the
reversal is to remand the case
for trial upon a petition which
no sufficient ground
for any relief, and where the respondent refuses to tender
any issue of fact. For these reasons, I would reverse the
judgment with the directions to the trial court to dismiss the
petition for writ of mandate.

